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Abstract
This article will assess the roles and responsibilities of Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF) within Mexico, as an active proponent of a so-called
"smart power" national security strategy. In particular, it will outline the
economic, political, and military challenges faced in Mexico, and specifi-
cally how and why SOF, under the new Special Operations Command
Northern Command (SOCNORTH),' should become the U.S. force of
choice for promoting the rule of law and human rights in Mexico. With the
goals of the U.S. military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to
"what success looks like" for both the United States and Mexico and the
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1. See, e.g., Otis W. McGregor III, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, Command And
Control Of Special Operations Forces Missions In The US Northern Command
Area Of Responsibility, 78 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432342.
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roles of each in joint and combined civil-military initiatives. Concluding
comments reflect on how these forces must model "what right looks like,"
and the imperative that SOF operations in Mexico meet legal and doctrinal
criteria for successful mission accomplishment.
I. Advanced Operational Base-Central America (AOB-CENTAM)-
A Model for SOCNORTH Operations?THE DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines
Unified Combatant Command (UCC)-or Unified Command-
as a:
command with a broad continuing mission under a single com-
mander and composed of significant assigned components of two or
more Military Departments that is established and so designated by
the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called
unified combatant command. 2
The National Security Act of 1947 was the first piece of legislation to
mention so-called "unified combatant commands," which have broad,
continuing missions and are composed of forces from two or more mili-
tary departments, as well as "specified combatant commands," which are
composed of forces from a single military department. 3 An outline of
these commands' authorities and responsibilities comes in Title 10, U.S.
Code section 161 et seq.4 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of De-
fense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986,5 sponsored by Senator Barry
Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, was the most significant de-
fense reorganization after the National Security Act of 1947. Of particu-
lar significance to defense strategy and policy, this Act centralized the
operational authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),
made the CJCS principal military advisor to the President, National Se-
curity Council, and Secretary of Defense, and streamlined the operational
chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
UCC commanders. 6 The UCCs appointed by the President carry full au-
thority unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary, and, ac-
2. DE'T O F DEFENSE, DICrIONARY OF MILITARY AND AssocIATED TiRMs, JOINT
PUBLICATION 1-02, 292 (Nov. 8, 2010, as amended through July 16, 2013), available
at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/newpubs/jp102.pdf.
3. 10 U.S.C. § 161 (2007); see DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 2, at 487; see also Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/nsaactl947.pdf.
4. 10 U.S.C. § 161 (2007); see DEW-T or DEFENSE, supra note 2, at 487; see also Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/nsaactl 947.pdf.
5. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986), available at http://www.nsa.gov/about/crypto-
logic.heritage/60th/interactivetimeline/Content/1980s/documents/1 9861001
1980 DocNDU.pdf.?
6. Id.; see also JOINT STAFF OFFICER INFORMATION CENTER, GUIDING DOCUMENTS
AND AUTIIORITls available at http://www.jsotraining.us/jsol01/docs/MOD%204-
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cording to Title 10, each is directly responsible for carrying out missions
assigned to the command.7
The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines UCP as
"[t]he document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic gui-
dance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions,
responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical
area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and speci-
fies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders."8
At the time of this article's writing, there were ten UCCs: four organized
as functional commands, and six geographical commands, to include U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (US-
SOUTHCOM), as depicted below:
Figure 1: Unified Command Plan-2011-Commander's Areas of Responsibility9
Guiding%20Does T3%20Guiding%20Documents%20and%20Authorities%20
List.pdf.
7. 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2010); see also The U.S. Military Presence Abroad, 8 Congres-
sional Digest-International Debates 6 (Sept. 2010), available at http://congression-
aldigest.comlissuelthe-u-s-military-presence-abroad/u-s-unified-combatant-
commands/.
8. DEP r OF DEFENSE, supra note 2, at 284.
9. Unified Command Plan, U.S. DEP"T FOF DFEINSE, http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/ (last updated Apr. 27, 2011). United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is not a geographic combatant com-
mand, but rather one of the functional commands. According to the USSOCOM
History:
The Department of Defense (DoD) activated U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) April 16, 1987, at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
DoD created the new unified command in response to congressional ac-
tion in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act of 1987. Congress mandated a new four-star command be activated
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The geographic combatant commands established Theater Special Op-
erations Commands (TSOCs or, more simply, SOCs) as subordinate uni-
fied commands in the 1980s.10 As the former Commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) described,
[i]n general, each SOC exercises operational control of assigned
forces, has responsibility for SOF-peculiar logistical requirements of
assigned forces, and forms the core of a joint special operations task
force able to act independently or as the special operations compo-
nent of a larger joint/combined task force. Ultimately, the theater
SOCs are responsible to CINCs for integrating and employing SOF
in theater plans."
The theater SOC for USSOUTHCOM is Special Operations Com-
mand-South (SOCSOUTH), "which is responsible for planning and ex-
ecuting mission command for Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean/
Central America (CCA)."12 The Advanced Operational Base-Central
America (AOB-CENTAM) is a Special Forces base located in Soto Cano,
Honduras, in operation for the past thirty years. 13 At present, a Special
Forces Operational Detachment-Bravo (SFODB), "AOB-CENTAM op-
erates alongside Joint Task Force Bravo [JTF-B] and commands and con-
trols SOF in nearly every country in Central America, from Guatemala to
Panama,"14 and is task-organized to reflect the long historical record of
to prepare Special Operations Forces (SOF) to carry out assigned mis-
sions and, if directed by the president or secretary of defense (SECDEF),
to plan for and conduct special operations.
United States Special Operations Command History, USSOCOM, http://
www.socom.mil/Pages/AboutUSSOCOM.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). Com-
ponent commands under USSOCOM include:
Approximately 57,000 active duty, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines and DoD civilians assigned to the headquar-
ters, its four components and one sub-unified command. USSOCOM's
components are U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC),
Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), Air Force
Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and Marine Corps Forces Spe-
cial Operations Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified command.
Id
10. See, e.g., Henry H. Shelton, Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Com-
mands, JOINr FORCES Q., 51 (Winter 1996-97), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA528704. Note: Shelton was the Commander-in-Chief (a
term no longer used except by the President of the United States), United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at the time of that article's writing.
On October 24, 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced
his decision that the use of "commander-in-chief" would thereafter be reserved for
the president only. See Jim Garamone, "CINC" Is Sunk, AMERICAN FoRCES
PRESS SERVICE (Oct. 25, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?
ID=42568.
11. Shelton, supra note 10, at 51.
12. Robert M. Kirila, Ahead of the Guns: SOF in Central America, SPECIAL WAR-
FARE, Oct.-Dec. 2012, at 17, available at http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/
publications/specialwarfare1001 12.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 17. See also Lt. Col. Shawn Satterfield, OEF-CCA: Irregular Applications
for USSOF Efforts, SPECIAL WARFARE, Oct.-Dec. 2012, at 11-14, available at
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SOF in Central America. 15
"On December 31, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta approved a re-
quest by General Jacoby, the commander of [NORTHCOM], and Admi-
ral McRaven, the commander of [USSOCOM], to establish a theater
special operations command at NORTHCOM, subsequently designated
Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH)."1 6 When fully op-
erational in 2014, the Colorado-based SOCNORTH will synchronize, co-
ordinate, and deconflict any operation assigned to SOF within
NORTHCOM, and will be the apportioned or assigned command and
control structure for the conduct of special operations in its Area of Re-
sponsibility (AOR), which includes Mexico, the United States' increas-
ingly destabilized neighbor to the South.17 According to NORTHCOM
http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/publications/specialwarfarel00l 12.pdf.
Note:
The Special Forces company headquarters, also known as a Special
Forces Operational Detachment Bravo, "B Detachment," or "B Team,"
is a multi-purpose C2 element with many employment options. It cannot
isolate and deploy Special Forces teams independently without signifi-
cant augmentation. A Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha
("A Team") cannot deploy or operate without the support of the B
Team. The B Team consists of eleven personnel and is the headquarters
element of the Special Forces Company. It acts as the command and
control of the A Teams within the company. The B Team establishes and
operates the Advanced Operational Base (AOB). The B Team can and
does: plan and conduct SF operations separately or as part of a larger
force; train and prepare Special Forces A-Teams for deployment; infil-
trate and exfiltrate operational areas by air, land, or sea; conduct opera-
tions in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of
time with minimal external direction or support; develop, organize,
equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous combat forces up to regi-
mental size in Special Operations (SO); and train, advise, and assist other
US and allied forces and agencies.
See Special Forces Operational Detachment Bravo (SFOD-B) "B Detachment" "B
Team", GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/
army/b-team.htm (last modified May 7, 2011).
15. Kirila, supra note 12, at 17.
16. Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH), GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (July
31, 2013), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socnorth.htm.
17. See, e.g., Homeland Security, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26, 11-7 (Aug. 2, 2005), availa-
ble at http://dmna.ny.gov/plans-training/j5/General %201nterest/Selected%20Joint
%20Pubs/JP_3-26_HomelandSecurityAug_05.pdf (for NORTHCOM's combat-
ant command roles in Homeland Security); see also Gay N. McGillis, Organizing
NOR THCOM for Success: A Theater Special Operations Command, SCIOOL OF
ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, 9 (First Term AY 02-03), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/
tr/fulltext/u2/a416189.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). SOF core activities, in Mex-
ico or anywhere SOF are deployed, may include the following:
Direct Action: Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive ac-
tions taken to seize, destroy, capture or recover in denied areas; Special
Reconnaissance: Acquiring information concerning the capabilities, in-
tentions and activities of an enemy; Unconventional Warfare: Operations
conducted by, through and with surrogate forces that are organized,
trained, equipped, supported and directed by external forces; Foreign In-
ternal Defense: Providing training and other assistance to foreign gov-
ernments and their militaries to enable the foreign government to
provide for its country's national security; Civil Affairs Operations: Ac-
tivities that establish, maintain or influence relations between U.S. forces
and foreign civil authorities and civilian populations to facilitate U.S.
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officials, SOCNORTH "has already helped Mexican officials set up their
own intelligence center in Mexico City to target criminal networks, pat-
terned after similar centers in war zones built to target al-Qaida in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq."' 8 According to multiple current and former U.S.
officials briefed on the mission, "[t]he new headquarters will also coordi-
nate special operations troops when needed for domestic roles like rescu-
ing survivors after a natural disaster, or helping the U.S. Coast Guard
strike ships carrying suspect cargo just outside U.S. territorial waters."19
II. The Economic, Political, And Military Challenges Faced In Mexico
Notwithstanding a general lack of media coverage in the United States
about Mexico, "the gravity of the security situation in Mexico and its re-
gional neighbors is significant," 2 0 such that in "each of the past two years,
there have been more violent deaths and more weapons recovered in
Mexico than any other place on earth." 21 This creates the extreme poten-
tial for narco-crime-fueled violence in Mexico spreading into U.S. terri-
tory.22 Add to that a looming "potential of a large-scale human
migration to the United States as a result of the spiraling violence," as
well as "infiltration by various non-state actors and, quite possibly, weap-
ons of mass destruction into the United States." 23 In response to these
challenges, NORTHCOM must operate within, and in respect to Mexico,
with a "power" approach that "underscores the necessity of a strong mili-
tary, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at
military operations; Counterterrorism: Measures taken to prevent, deter
and respond to terrorism; Psychological Operations: Operations that
provide truthful information to foreign audiences that influence behavior
in support of U.S. military operations; Information Operations: Opera-
tions designed to achieve information superiority by adversely affecting
enemy information and systems while protecting U.S. information and
systems; Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Actions
taken to locate, seize, destroy or capture, recover and render such weap-
ons safe; Security Force Assistance: Unified action by joint, interagency,
intergovernmental and multinational community to sustain and assist
host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate author-
ity; Counterinsurgency Operations: Those military, paramilitary, politi-
cal, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to
defeat insurgency, and; Activities Specified by the President or
SECDEF.
United States Special Operations Command History, supra note 9.
18. Kimberly Dozier, US Commandos Boost Numbers to Train Mexican Forces,
AP.oiRG (Jan. 17, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-commandos-boost-num-
bers-train-mexican-forces.
19. Id.
20. Kirila, supra note 12, at 16.
21. Id.
22. Clay T. Fimiani, U.S. Northern Command's Security Role in Mexico: An Indirect
Approach to Building Capacity Among the Mexican Military, 2 (May 4, 2011) (un-
published thesis, Naval War College), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=
709500.
23. Id.; see also Tom Bowman, CIA and Pentagon Wonder: Could Mexico Implode?
NPR (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1012
15537 (cited with authority by Fimiani, supra note 22).
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all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of
American action." 24 It must also develop integrated strategies (civil-mili-
tary), resource bases (economic, political, and military), and tool kits
(military and diplomatic capabilities) to achieve American objectives. 2 5
Regarding Mexican narco-crime violence, "[d]rug trafficking, once
dominated by Colombian cartels, is now dominated by Mexican criminal
organizations like Los Zetas [(Zetas / Zs)] and the Sinaloa and Gulf car-
tels [Cdtrtel del Golfo, Golfos, or CDG (Gulf) cartels]." 26 These cartels'
worldwide expansion "has generated massive amounts of profit and
firmly establishe[d] these cartels as illicit multinational corporations ...
run by intelligent and ruthless chief executives [who are] . . . super-em-
powered non-state actors." 27 "Mexican cartels have taken advantage of
the high state of corruption or low level of competency that exists in
many of the local, regional and sometimes national-level governments
throughout Central America."128 Driven by the strategic necessity to
counter these challenges and U.S. policy considerations of retaining a
minimal "footprint" in Mexico, the U.S. military has quietly adapted its
procedures to primarily employ SOF with great effectiveness, in conjunc-
tion with selected conventional forces, to advance NORTHCOM
initiatives.
Following the SOCSOUTH model, "AOB-CENTAM commands and
controls and synchronizes USSOF in Central America alongside partner-
nation military and paramilitary forces ... [and the] lines of operation for
all of the elements under the mission command of AOB-CENTAM are
[to] build capability and capacity, build influence and counter transna-
tional threats."29 SOCNORTH will need to conduct programs "to pre-
vent extremists from capitalizing on political discontent, ethnic rivalries
and economic frustration to fuel their strategy of terror and violence in
[the AOR]."30 SOCNORTH, like OEF-CCA, will need to conduct joint
operations, in which ARSOF and other military elements and entities can
participate,3' as well as interagency efforts as a result of the involvement
of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, and SOUTHCOM Military Groups in planning, co-
ordinating, and/or executing missions in Mexico. 32 Finally, SOCNORTH
must facilitate the combined participation of U.S. and Mexican host-na-
24. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L SruDII-s, CSIS
COMMISSION ON SMART PowER 7 (2007), available at http://csis.org/files/medial
csis/pubs/071106 esissmartpowerreport.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Kirila, supra note 12, at 16 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 17.
30. John M. Doyle, Special Operations: Shrinking World, Growing Problems,
4GWAR, (Nov. 14, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://4gwar.wordpress.com/2012/11/14/spe-
cial-operations-shrinking-world-growing-problems/.
31. Kirila, supra note 12, at 17.
32. Id.
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tion diplomatic, military, and other agencies,33 including trusted Fuerzas
Armadas de Mexico (Mexican Armed Forces) and Policia Federal (Fed-
eral Police) elements, whereby multiple agencies interweave agendas and
objectives by personally meeting with, coordinating, synchronizing, and
demonstrating the achievements of the disparate objectives to local, na-
tional, and regional policy makers. 34
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is one of Army Special Operations
Forces' (ARSOF) core tasks35 involving "[p]articipation by civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by
another government or other designated organization to free and protect
its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other
threats to its security." 36 Its primary intent is to
help the legitimate governing body address internal threats and their
underlying causes through a host-nation, or HN, program of internal
defense and development . . . not restricted to times of conflict ...
[as] an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities, po-
tentially including the conduct of all other ARSOF core activities.37
Special Operations Doctrine expert Jeffrey Hassler describes FID as "a
whole-of-U.S. government effort approach based in law [that] is not a
subordinate activity to counterinsurgency (COIN);38 that is,
"[c]omprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insur-
gency and to address any core grievances." 39 The unique skills organic to
SOF elements contribute to the development of partner nation capabili-
ties with a long-term objective of building and sustaining capability to
conduct unilateral operations against threats to national or regional
security.40
As the U.S. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has pointed
out, U.S.-Mexican military relations have changed fundamentally in re-
cent years, largely as "a consequence of mutually identified threats, out-
reach programs that have fostered joint understandings, and Mexican
military transformation efforts that both countries judge as essential for
33. Id.
34. Id. See also Ginger Thompson, Randal C. Archibold & Eric Schmitt, Hand of U.S.
Is Seen in Halting General's Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/world/americas/us-stepped-in-to-halt-mexican-
generals-rise.html.
35. DEP'T oiF DFFENSF, supra note 2, at 19, 107. See also DlP'T OF i THEI ARMY, ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCEs FM 3-05 (100-25) 2-2 (2011). The foreign internal
defense definition is paraphrased. Definitions from both references are similar.
36. Dr'r OF DEFENsE, supra note 2, at 107.
37. Jeffrey Hassler, Defining War 2011, 24 SPECIAL WARFARE (Jan.-Feb. 2011), avail-
able at http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2401/SW2401DefiningWar.html.
38. Id.
39. Dr'T oF DEFENSE, supra note 2 at 62 (defining counterinsurgency). Conversely,
"insurgency" is defined as "[t]he organized use of subversion and violence by a
group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing au-
thority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself." Id. at 134.
40. See Hassler, supra note 36.
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promoting national and regional security." 41 Mexican SOF in particu-
lar-as well as selected law enforcement components-have received
substantial U.S. military support, in the guise of "homologation of SOF
tactics, techniques, and procedures, mutual understanding and coopera-
tion is fostered through education," especially, but not exclusively, from
JSOU-the education component of the USSOCOM. 4 2 JSOU assesses
that "[i]n the current environment of insurgency, narcotrafficking, and a
threatened government under stress, educational activities represent an
effective 'indirect approach' toward achieving national interests." 43
To that end, any action in Mexico by U.S. authorities must thus be at
the request and under the control of Mexican authorities, and Attorney
General Eric Holder vowed in 2011 to look into Mexico forbidding U.S.
law enforcement officers from carrying guns into Mexico stating, "[w]e
will look at this and we'll do . . . an analysis of what it is that we need to
do to make sure that everybody is as safe down there as we can make
them." 44 National Intelligence Center Admiral James Winnefeld, former
head of NORTHCOM, wrote that the United States is eager to work with
Mexico, but "the very first question we ask is whether or not it would
infringe in any way on Mexico's sovereignty or rule of law. The answer,
quite simply, must be 'No, it does not." 45 Collectively and individually,
Mexico will continue to raise many challenges surrounding the balance
between military power, civil society, and the rule of law. With the goals
of the U.S. military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to "what
success looks like" for both the United States and Mexico and the roles of
each in joint and combined civil-military initiatives.46
III. Surveying The Need For A SOCNORTH Effort To Promote
Human Rights And Rule Of Law In Mexico
Center for International Policy expert Laura Carlsen opines that "Mex-
ico is currently confronting a human rights crisis" with media headlines
41. GRAHIAM H. TURI31VILLE, JR., JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV., U.S. MILITARY
ENGAGEMENT WIT!I MEXICO: UNEASY PAST AND CHALLENGING FUTURE, ix (Oct.
2, 2010), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/report/2010/
1003 jsou-report-10-2.pdf.
42. Id. at x.
43. Id.
44. Jim Koun, Mexico Bans U.S. Law Enforcement Officials from Carrying Guns, Ex-
AMINER.COM, (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/article/mexico-bans-u-s-
law-enforcement-officials-from-carrying-guns; but see Ronald Ostrow & Douglas
Jehl, Mexico Says U.S. Agents May Carry Guns: Drugs: They Also Will Have Dip-
lomatic Immunity as Part of the Two Countries' Stepped-Up Cooperation on Anti-
Narcotics, L.A. TIMIus, June 29, 1990 at 17, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
1990-06-29/news/mn-664_1_diplomatic-immunity.
45. NORTHCOM reassures Mexico over Drone Flights, AssOCIATE) PRESS (Mar. 18,
2011), http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/03/ap-uav-mexico-dug-surveil-
lance-flight-03181 1/.
46. For an analogous approach to U.S. Africa Command's challenges, see Kevin Gov-
ern, 21st Century Africa as an "Arc Of (In)Stability": U.S. and African Economic,
Security, and Development Policies Advanced Through U.S. Mexico Command Ini-
tiatives, 26 CONN. J. INT'L LAw 281 (2011).
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highlighting "the overt violence that has claimed more than 50,000 lives
since December 11, 2006, when President Felipe Calder6n launched the
war on drugs." 47 The war on drugs' origins and effects are complex, ac-
cording to Carlsen, such that
beneath the bloodshed, the erosion of the rule of law and the system-
atic violation of human rights in the context of the armed conflict
caused by the drug war has created a more profound crisis in Mexi-
can society, one the causes and effects of which are not only ill-de-
fined but often purposely obscured. 4 8
"In a series of 'Joint Operations' between Federal Police and Armed
Forces, the Mexican government has deployed more than 45,000 troops
into various regions of the country in an unprecedented domestic low-
intensity conflict." 4 9 In its efforts, the Mexican federal government "con-
tinues to define a semi-permanent role for the Armed Forces in the drug
war, which in the absence of a declared state of emergency is difficult to
justify,"5 0 with a situation compounded by Armed Forces
trained in a war model that posits annihilation of an identifiable en-
emy, [yet] deployed to communities where civilians are defined as
suspected enemies, soldiers and officers [and which] have responded
too often with arbitrary arrests, personal agendas and corruption, ex-
47. Laura Carlsen, Mexico's False Dilemma: Human Rights or Security Laura Carl-
sen,10 Nw. U. J. IN-i Hum. Ris. 146, 146 (2012), available at http://scholarlycom-
mons.Iaw.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=njihr.
48. Id. Estimates of the total that have died in connection with the fighting over the
last six years range from 47,000 to more than 70,000, in addition to thousands of
disappearances.
The Mexican government frequently uses the figure 50,000. Several gov-
ernment agencies provide information, but are often contradictory and
not up-to-date. The President's office counts 'deaths from presumed ri-
valries between delinquents.' This recently created speculative category,
which the government webpage is quick to note 'makes no imputations
of a legal character,' does not list national totals. See Base de Datos de
Fallecimientos, Presidencia de la Republica, http://www.presidencia.gob.
mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). Walter
McKay, a former police officer at WM Consulting in Mexico City
monitors press accounts to create a meticulous narco-killing mapping
process that registered 54,064 victims as of March 2012. See Narco Kill-
ings, WM Consulting, https://sites.google.com/site/policereform/narco-
killings (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). The Tijuana investigative reporting
magazine Zeta concludes that the December number is 60,420, using a
composite of official sources. Quinto Afio de Gobierno: 60 mil 420
Ejecuciones, ZETA (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.zetatijuana.com/2011/12/
12/quinto-ano-de-gobierno-60-mil-420-ejecuciones/. For an article in En-
glish on the early Operation Michoacin, see Sara Miller Llana, Mexican
Army Invades Pot Plantations, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/2006-12-21 -mexico-drug-effort x.htm.
See id. at 146 n.1-2.
49. Id. at 146. 45,000 is the most frequently quoted figure. See, e.g., Polarization and
Sustained Violence in Mexico's Cartel War, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTILLIGEILNCE
(Jan. 24, 2012), available at www.stratfor.com/analysis/polarization-and-sustained-
violence-mexicos-cartel-war.
50. Carlsen, supra note 47, at 147.
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trajudicial executions, the use of torture, and excessive use of force. 51
In January 2013, Mexico's Interior Minister, Miguel Angel Osorio
Chong, announced plans to form a new intelligence agency analogous to
the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) but with a domestic
focus, the new National Intelligence Center (Centro Nacional de Inte-
ligencia, or CNI). 5 2 CNI's mission is to fight organized crime, and it "will
act as a central collection point for intelligence collected by all other in-
telligence and justice entities in Mexico, including the police, military, At-
torney General's Office, and other federal and state agencies."53
A not-entirely-satisfactory solution has been efforts to try all resulting
cases
related to military personnel in military tribunals, known as the fuero
militar or military exemption from civil prosecution, [which] inhibits
legal and social accountability and in practice has led to a very low
prosecution rate. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that of 3,671
investigations opened in the military court system between 2007 and
2011, only 29 resulted in convictions of soldiers,54
a result derived from "cronyism and favoritism to manipulate the organs
of law enforcement and judicial systems, or flaunt international efforts to
advance and promote justice."55
The National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR), HRW, and
local and state human rights groups also report major increases in
forced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial executions, many al-
legedly perpetrated by Mexican security forces . . . [with a] 70 per-
cent increase in complaints of human rights violations [especially
arbitrary arrest, torture, and extortion] between 2010-2011 com-
pared to the previous level, the majority of which were filed regis-
tered against security forces, especially the Federal Police and
Army.56
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Robert Morton, Mexico Creates CIA Spy Agency, EXAMINER.COM (Jan.
23, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/mexico-creates-cia-spy-agency.
53. Id.
54. Carlsen, supra note 47, at 147-48.; see also Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, Mexico: Letter to
Senate on Military Justice Reform, HUMAN RiGHrs WATCH 1, (Apr. 10, 2012), http://
www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/10/mexico-letter-senate-military-justice-reform.
55. Kevin H. Govern, Smart Power for Hard Problems: The Role of Special Operations
Forces Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Africa (2012) at 5,
https://www.1aw.upenn.edulive/files/1 926-new-governsmartpowerforhardproblems
africapdf.
56. Carlsen, supra note 47, at 148-49; see also Vivanco, supra note 54 (citing Cabrera
Garcia and Montiel Flores v. M6xico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, T 200 (Nov. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_220-ing.pdf).
This is consistent with the views of the United Nations and other international
human rights bodies. In the draft principles on military justice adopted by the
former United Nations Human Rights Commission, principle No. 9 states that,
"[i]n all circumstances, the jurisdiction of military courts should be set aside in
favour of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to conduct inquiries into serious
human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances
and torture, and to prosecute and try persons accused of such crimes." Special
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Carlsen further cited that "[t]he NCHR has registered 475 forced dis-
appearances in September 2011, compared to some four to six cases in
2006."57 By way of contrast, unpublished Procuraduria General de la
Reptiblica-PGR (Attorney General Office) documents show that "more
than 25,000 adults and children have gone missing in Mexico in the past
six years."58 This should be viewed in the context that disappearance
cases are widely underreported, and the "[Mexican] federal government
does not register forced disappearances, nor are they investigated in most
cases."59 Carlson further posits that,
[a]ccording to the Ministry of Defense, the Army receives an average
of four human rights complaints a day as a result of its involvement
in the drug war [with the] . . . total number of complaints registered
by the NCHR against the army since the start of the drug war under
the Calder6n administration [at] 5,055 by mid-2011; only 79 recom-
mendations had been issued. 60
In the U.S. Department of State's estimation,
[t]he most serious human rights issues in the country arose from the
fight against organized crime, which involved frequent clashes be-
tween security forces and Transnational Criminal Organizations
(TCOs) . . . [and, in] multiple instances, TCOs used brutal tactics
against members of the public. TCOs remained the most significant
perpetrators of violent crimes in the country, showing disregard for
civilian casualties, engaging in human trafficking, and intimidating
journalists and human rights defenders with violence and threats.61
Sometimes in the context of the fight against TCOs, but also at times
unrelated to it, security forces reportedly engaged in unlawful kill-
ings, forced disappearances, and instances of physical abuse and
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Report on Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice
Through Military Tribunals, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/
58 (Jan. 13, 2006) (by Emmanuel Decaux).
57. Carlsen, supra note 47 at 149 (citation omitted).
58. William Booth, Mexico's Crime Wave Has Left About 25,000 Missing, Government
Documents Show, TiHE WASHINGTON Pos-r, Nov. 29, 2012, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/world/the americas/mexicos-crime-wave-has-left-up-to-25000-
missing-government-documents-show/2012/11/29/7ca4ee44-3a6a- 11 e2-92 58-
ac7c78d5c680_story.html.
59. Carlsen, supra note 47, at 149 (citation omitted). Carlsen further notes:
some major violations of human rights cannot be successfully prosecuted
due to gaps in the law. Neither femicide, which rose notably during the
drug war period, nor forced disappearances are typified as such under
the law. Currently femicides and disappearances are registered as
kidnappings or missing person reports. As a result, the kidnapping unit
of the Attorney General's Office (PGR) is overwhelmed and forced dis-
appearances are not counted. Forced disappearances are not classified as
a specific crime under Mexican federal law. Some Mexican states are
thus moving to pass specific laws on forced disappearances and human
rights groups in Mexico have called for a national law as well.
Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
60. Id. (citations omitted)
61. Id.
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torture.62
Notwithstanding Mexico's own National Human Rights Commission's
(CNDH) role as Mexico's national human rights institution, there is still
a pernicious prevalence of "kidnappings; physical abuse; poor, over-
crowded prison conditions; arbitrary arrest[s] and detention[s]; corrup-
tion and lack of transparency that engendered impunity within the
judicial system; and confessions coerced through torture." 63 Underlying
and related societal problems include "killings of women; domestic vio-
lence; threats and violence against journalists and social media users,
leading to self-censorship in some cases; trafficking in persons; social and
economic discrimination against some members of the indigenous popu-
lation; and child labor."64 The U.S. Department of State noted in 2012
that "[diespite some arrests for corruption, widespread impunity for
human rights abuses by officials remained a problem in both civilian and
military jurisdictions."'65
As part of the solution-and perhaps part of the problem-Human
Rights Watch opines that Mexico's military and police have committed
"widespread human rights violations in their efforts to combat violent
drug cartels-including killings, torture and disappearances-which have
only exacerbated a climate of lawlessness and fear in many parts of the
country," 6 6 such that "[t]hese violations persist, and in fact have in-
creased, because the members of security forces who commit them are
virtually never held accountable." 6 7 In their efforts to report these
abuses and cartel violence, "[h]uman rights defenders and journalists . . .
are targeted for attack by criminal groups and members of security forces
alike,"'6 8 without the state protecting these groups or investigating the
crimes committed against them. 6 9
According to the Mexican Attorney General's Office, there were
"12,456 homicides in 2010, and a cumulative of 30,196 homicides since
December 2006 when Felipe Calder6n became president of Mexico and
deployed military forces to combat drug cartels." 70 Amnesty Interna-
tional (AI) noted the number of deaths in 2010 alone represented 41.2
percent of the total number of homicides since 2006, thus 2010 became
the worst year in Mexican history for criminal violence.71 Al further
62. U.S. DEiP'T OF1 STATE, COuNRY RErORTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACICES FOR
2012, MEXICO 1, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/









70. Mexico Human Rights, AMNEESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/
countries/americas/mexico (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
71. Id.
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noted reports of mass abduction of Central American migrants prompted
the governments of "Guatemala and El Salvador to call on the Mexican
government for accountability for the treatment of migrants crossing
Mexico," 72 resulting in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issu-
ing ground-breaking rulings against Mexico in seven cases involving grave
human rights violations, three of which were held in 2010.73
The United Nations Working Group on enforced or involuntary disap-
pearances warned that "[e]nforced disappearances in Mexico have hap-
pened in the past and continue to happen today . . . [under a] chronic
pattern of impunity demonstrated by the absence of effective investiga-
tions in cases of enforced disappearances." 7 4 The Group exhorted Mex-
ico to "recogni[z]e the scale of the problem as a first step in developing
comprehensive and effective measures to eradicate it," that "[t]his chal-
lenging situation cannot be confronted if respect for human rights is ig-
nored" and that it is necessary to launch appropriate and thorough
criminal investigations on enforced disappearances as well as to build
public trust in the justice system, the Public Ministries, the police, and the
armed forces.75 In the wake of organized crime, 47,515 people lost their
lives during the six-year presidency of Felipe Calder6n, but with numbers
declining.76
On a positive note, The United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, "welcomed the promulgation of Mexico's
new Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists
72. Id.
73. These cases have involved "violations of the right to liberty, personal integrity, due
process and judicial protection." See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Issues Sentence in Mexican Case Involving Ecologists Rodolfo Montiel and Teo-
doro Cabrera, Washington Office on Latin America (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.
wola.org/inter americancourtofhuman-rights-issues sentence-in-mexican_
case involving-ecologists-rodolfomo. The most recent case taken to the IACHR
was a May 2013 application filed in Case No. 12.288, Garcia Cruz and SAnchez
Silvestre, Mexico. See Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, IACHR Takes Case Involving Mexico to the Inter-American Court (May
9, 2013), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mediacenter/PReleases/2013/
033.asp ("The facts of this case refer to the illegal detention and torture of Juan
Garcia Cruz and Santiago Sanchez Silvestre, as well as their subsequent convic-
tions for three years and 40 years in prison, following two criminal trials where no
due process was observed, in particular because of the use of confessions obtained
under torture and the lack of investigation and the failure to punish the allegations
of torture.").
74. UN Experts Express Concern for Impunity in Cases of Enforced Disappearances in
Mexico, UN! fED NATIONs HUMAN RIGi-rs (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/
ENINewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?Newsl D=1 1963&Langl D=E.
75. Id.
76. Mexican Daily: Nearly 60,000 Drug War Deaths Under Calderon, Fox Niews LA-
TINO (Nov. 1, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/11/01/mexican-
daily-nearly-60000-drug-war-deaths-under-calderon/#ixzz2eooEUahb ("Based on
its own calculations, the Monterrey-based newspaper (Milenio Daily] also put the
number of drug war-related homicides thus far in 2012 at 10,485 and said 888 peo-
ple were killed in October, the second-lowest monthly total [for 2012].").
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and called for its immediate implementation." 77 The legislation signed
into law by President Calder6n
aims to protect the life, integrity, liberty and security of those at risk
because of their work defending and promoting human rights, or for
exercising their right to freedom of expression, [and] builds on previ-
ous efforts by the Government and civil society to create a national
protection mechanism-including the presidential decree that set the
foundations for it, which was signed . . . in July 2011. . . . Pillay
stressed that the protection measures established by the Law must be
accompanied by effective measures to combat impunity in Mexico.78
Despite the fact that "human rights violations such as enforced disap-
pearances, torture, arbitrary detentions and lack of access to justice be-
came routine during the previous administration,"79 it appears that
Mexican President Enrique Pefia Nieto's "positive discourse regarding
human rights, including commitments to move ahead with the General
Victim's Law and reform of laws criminalizing enforced disappearances,
are welcome but promises and good intentions are not enough to eradi-
cate and prevent human rights violations."80 Only time-and effort-will
tell whether the Pefia Nieto government can and will strengthen rule of
law and respect and protect human rights in Mexico to a greater extent
than his predecessors, especially in the realms of enhancing public secur-
ity, reforming military justice, promoting human rights defenders, pro-
tecting migrants, eradicating government use of torture and
"disappearances," ending criminal impunity and violence towards wo-
men, protecting indigenous peoples, and complying with binding judg-
ments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.81
IV. Measures of Effectiveness for SOF Rule of Law and Human
Rights Missions in Mexico
In their mix of direct and indirect approaches to promote stability and
security, advancing the rule of law and human rights in Mexico, SOF will
face tremendous ambiguity in knowing "what right looks like." Absent
specified rule of law tasks, SOF may look to doctrine on what constitutes
77. Pillay Welcomes Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journal-
ists in Mexico, UNrfIED NATIONs HUMAN RIGros (June 22, 2012), http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?Newsl D=1 2279&LanglD=E.
78. Id.
79. Press Release, Carolyn Lang, AMNESTY INT'L, New Mexican President Enrique
Pefla Nieto Must Break with Legacy of Human Rights Violations (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/new-mexican-president-enrique-
pena-nieto-must-break-with-legacy-of-human-rights-violations.
80. Id. See also Carlsen, supra note 47, at 151 ("The 2005 National Security Law in
Mexico places national security as the priority, and defines national security in
Article 3: 'For the effects of this Law, national security is understood as the actions
destined to immediately and directly maintain the integrity, stability and perma-
nence of the Mexican State"' (citing Ley de Seguridad Nacional [L.S.N.] [National
Security Law], art/ 3, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO.], 31 de Enero de 2005
(Mex.)).
81. See generally AMNESTY INi'i-, supra note 79.
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rule of law: "[r]ule of law is a principle of governance in which all per-
sons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself,
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced,
and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with interna-
tional human rights principles." 82
This Army doctrinal definition is, for all intents and purposes, the same
as the U.S. Government (USG) interagency definition, 83 and the U.S.
Army's Rule of Law Handbook breaks rule of law into seven effects:
* "the state monopolizes the use of force in the resolution of
disputes;"
* "individuals are secure in their persons and property;"
* "the state is itself bound by law and does not act arbitrarily;"
* "the law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow
individuals to plan their affairs;"
* "individuals have meaningful access to an effective and impartial
legal system;"
* "the state protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms;"
and
* "individuals rely on the existence of justice institutions and the con-
tent of law in the conduct of their daily lives." 84
SOF provide an indirect approach contributing to supporting inter-
agency diplomacy and development efforts, and, in doing so, SOF must
82. U.S. DEi'T' OF Triru ARMv, FM 3-07, STAmrIry OPERATIONS 1-9 (2008) available
at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf (cited with authority
in Tiie: JUi)GE AovocATrE GENIRAL 's LEGAL CENTER & SCooL, U.S. ARMY,
Rute ot LAW HANDBOOK 3 (2011) available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Mili-
taryLaw/pdf/rule-of-law_2011.pdf ("This definition was also adopted by the
Corps. Commander in Iraq as early as 2006. See Appendix 2 to Annex G to MNC-
I Operation Order 06-03.") (definition based in part on U.N. Secretary-General,
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 1
6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doclUNDOC/GENIN04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement ("[The rule of
law] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and enti-
ties, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law,
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance
of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."))).
83. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., SEcuRIrY SECFOR REi-ORM 4 (2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf ("Rule of Law is a princi-
ple under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including
the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally en-
forced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights law") (cited with authority in RULE OF. LAw HANDBOOK, supra note
82, at 4).
84. U.S. DEP' OF THE ARMY, supra note 82 at 1-9; RULE of, LAw HANDnOOK, supra
note 82, at 3, 4 n.12 ("[o]f the many definitions of the rule of law in common use,
the list of seven effects resembles JANE STROMsETi, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA
BROOKS, CAN MIGHIT MAKE Rica ITS?: BUILDING TIE RuLE- oiF LAw AErER MI-
TARY INTERVENTIONs 78 (2006)").
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scrupulously demonstrate the highest legal, ethical, and moral standards
in personal and professional conduct. What better way to hold the "high
ground" than to encourage those being trained and those advised to do
likewise? SOF's furtherance of rule of law and human rights, in every
instance, can and must be measured against and meet the five SOF Mis-
sion Criteria:
* "it must be an appropriate mission or activity for SOF."
* "the mission or activities should support the Joint Force Com-
mander's (JFC) campaign or operation plan, or special activities;"
* "the missions or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and
fully coordinated;"
* "the required resources must be available to execute and support
the SOF mission;" and
* "the expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks."85
In every instance, the United States must strive to support Mexico to
find and implement Mexican solutions to Mexican problems wherever
possible. As part of President Barack Obama's visit to Mexico in May
2013, "[President] Pefia Nieto said .. . his government remains committed
to fighting organized crime, but that the United States and Mexico must
'cooperate on the basis of mutual respect, to be more efficient in our
security strategy that we are implementing in Mexico.'" 86 Obama
stressed cooperative ventures on security, vowing he "agreed to continue
[the United States'] close cooperation on security, even as that nature of
that close cooperation will evolve," with the caveat that "[i]t's up to the
Mexican people . . . 'to determine their security structures and how it
engages with other nations, including the United States." 87
V. Conclusion
The United States' effective use of SOF in Mexico will likely mean, as
it has in other AORs, fewer in extremis requirements for direct action/
targeted killing of terrorists and other persons threatening U.S. national
85. U.S. DEP'Tr OF DEF., SPECIAL OPERATIONS, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05 x (Apr. 18,
2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new-pubs/jp305.pdf.
86. Dan Merica & Catherine E. Shoichet, 'A New Mexico is Emerging,' Obama Says;
Speech Addresses Immigration, Education, CNN (May 4, 2013), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/05/03/world/americas/mexico-obama-visit.
87. Id. See also Adam Isacson, "Special Operations Command North" to Work with
Mexico's Military, JusT HiE FACS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://justf.org/blog/2013/01/18/
special-operations-command-north-work-mexicos-military. Isacson opines that
this SOCNORTH role in Mexico brings up three points:
1. It signals a closer relationship with Mexico's Defense Department
(SEDENA) under the new leadership that came in with President En-
rique Pefia Nieto .... 2. It appears that one of SOCNORTH's first tasks
is helping the Pefia Nieto government to stand up a new intelligence unit
within the Interior Ministry . . . . 3. This is an emblematic indication that
the Obama administration's "light footprint" strategy is moving ahead.
Id.
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security and more missions across the spectrum of operations.88 SOF will
play an indispensable role in aiding Mexican nations with "foreign inter-
nal defense" missions, which consists of "participation by civilian and mil-
itary agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by
another government or other designated organization, to free and protect
its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other
threats to its security."89 As challenges in Mexico arise and continue,
NORTHCOM's need for SOF will increase-with or without a
SOCNORTH-utilizing SOF's highly trained, culturally astute, superbly
disciplined, uniformed service members to promote and maintain a vigi-
lant and active peace.
Operating in joint, combined, and interagency operations, SOF "diplo-
mat-warriors" can coordinate and synchronize U.S. military activities
with U.S. diplomatic and economic initiatives to eliminate the root causes
of terrorism, rather than exclusively targeting the symptomatic expres-
sions of terror in Mexico and elsewhere abroad. SOF will continue to
play a vital role prescriptively promoting the rule of law and human rights
as well as economic opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution of
conflict, while maintaining the capability to deliberately and carefully tai-
lor uses of authorized, licit force around the world.90
88. Kevin Govern, Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing Bin Laden A Legitimate Mil-
itary Objective?, in TARGETED KILLINGs-LAW AND MORALITY IN AN AsYMMETRI-
CAL WORLD 373 n.148 (Claire Finkelstein et al., eds., 2012), available at http://
militarylegitimacyreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Govern-71.pdf ("'In-ex-
tremis' refers to a situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action
must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the
political or military situation.").
89. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, JOINT PUBICATION 3-22 ix
(2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_22.pdf.
90. Govern, supra note 46, at 285.
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